Global injustice and redistributive wars by Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper
LEAP, 1 (2013)
Global Injustice  
and Redistributive Wars*
KASPER LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN 
Aarhus University
Abstract
On Pogge’s view, we —people living in rich countries— do not just allow the 
global poor to die. Rather, we interfere with them in such a way that we make 
them die on a massive scale. If we did the same through military aggression 
against them, surely, it would be permissible for these people to wage war on 
us to prevent this. Suppose Pogge’s analysis of the causes of global poverty is 
correct, and assume the moral permissibility of self-defence by poor people 
in the hypothetical military action scenario just mentioned. If these assump-
tions are correct, poor countries could start just and, even possibly, morally 
permissible redistributive wars against us provided various additional con-
ditions are met. To avoid misunderstanding, I should stress that my main 
claim is the conditional equivalence claim, namely that if Pogge’s analysis of 
the causes of global poverty is correct, our relation to poor countries is mor-
ally equivalent to one in which we each year killed many of the global poor 
by military means. I do not claim (i) that Pogge’s analysis is correct; (ii) that, 
as a matter of fact, it is morally permissible for poor countries to wage redis-
tributive wars against rich countries; (iii) that it is not the case that anything 
that is impermissible for poor countries to do in the latter situation involving 
military aggression —e. g. deliberately targeting rich civilians— is impermis-
sible in redistributive wars as well.
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1. INTRODUCTION
According to Philippa Foot, it is sometimes morally worse to bring about a 
bad outcome than merely to allow it. Highlighting the intuitive pull of the 
distinction, Foot writes that “(m)ost of us allow people to die of starvation 
in India and Africa, and there is surely something wrong with us that we 
do; it would be nonsense, however, to pretend that it is only in law that 
we make the distinction between allowing people in the underdeveloped 
countries to die of starvation and sending them poisoned food. There is 
worked into our moral system a distinction between what we owe people 
in the form of aid and what we owe them in the way of non-interference” 
(Foot 1981: 26-27). Many have contested the coherence or moral relevance 
of the distinction between doing and allowing harm (see Bennett, 1995; Ka-
gan 1989). For present purposes, however, I will assume that there is some 
such distinction and that it possesses moral relevance such that it is harder 
to morally justify harming people than to morally justify allowing them to 
be harmed. My enquiry takes its point of departure in Thomas Pogge’s ac-
count of global poverty. If his account is correct, Foot’s example fails to il-
lustrate the contrast between bringing about and allowing a bad outcome. 
On Pogge’s view, we do not just allow the global poor to die and, accord-
ingly and unlike what Foot suggests, we do not merely fail to meet a posi-
tive duty by not sending them food. Rather, we interfere with them in such 
a way that we make them die.1 And poor people die on a massive scale as a 
result of our interfering with them. Pogge (2008: 24) estimates that there is 
“a stable toll of 18 million premature deaths per year from poverty-related 
causes”.
Suppose we —people living in rich countries— killed 18 million people in 
India and Africa each year by sending them poisoned food to save ourselves 
from some rather insignificant costs per capita-wise, or did so through mili-
tary actions. If so, India and African countries might well act justly were they 
to wage war on us to prevent our hypothetical mass killing of their citizens. 
Suppose too that Pogge is correct that we bring about this massive number 
of deaths each year in poor countries, and assume the moral permissibility 
of self-defence by poor countries in the hypothetical poison- and military 
action scenarios. An obvious question now arises: would poor countries not 
similarly be engaged in a just —perhaps even morally permissible— war, 
were they to take up arms to force us —people living in rich countries— to 
1. Nowhere does Pogge write that we kill poor people. I am not certain why he is reluctant 
to put his point in these terms. He does however write things like: “the global economic re-
gime that our countries designed and impose kills more efficiently than the Nazi extermination 
camps” (Pogge 2010a).
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eliminate the unjust global structure that we impose on them thereby caus-
ing deaths among them on such a massive scale?
When addressing the issue of what can and should be done to eliminate 
global poverty, Pogge restricts himself to consider the question of what we 
—rich people— should do to alleviate or eradicate global poverty. I want to 
address the question of global poverty from a different perspective: what can 
they —poor people— permissibly or, at least, justly do to us —rich people, 
comparably speaking, like you and me, I assume— in order to end global 
poverty, provided that we do not do what we have a duty to do to eradicate 
poverty?2
I shall argue that if Pogge’s analysis of global poverty is correct, poor 
countries could start just and, even possibly, morally permissible redistribu-
tive wars against us provided various conditions are met (Valentini, forth-
coming). These include the obviously satisfied condition that we do not our-
selves take what, according to Pogge, are the inexpensive steps that would 
enable the elimination of global poverty. Indeed, given the stakes at hand 
they could do so without wronging us, even if these wars would involve a 
very large number of civilian casualties in rich countries. For reasons to be 
explained, it is much more unlikely that such redistributive war will be mor-
ally permissible than that they will be just.
My defence of these claims is based on a number of simplifying assump-
tions. One is that the world divides into two groups of states: poor states 
populated with poor people only and rich states populated with rich people 
only. Hence, in my hypothetical world when a poor state attacks a rich coun-
try, it is in effect poor people waging war against rich people. Accordingly, I 
set aside (except when otherwise stated) very pertinent complications about 
how a wealthy elite that autocratically rules a poor country for its own ben-
efit and in ways that harm its poor citizens can justly wage war against a rich 
country on grounds of the harms imposed by rich countries on its poor citi-
zens (Fabre, forthcoming: chapter 3). Similarly, I ignore the issue of respon-
sibility in relation to rich people who oppose their government’s policies on 
global justice issues and try to resist them in vain, or the issue of (not so rich) 
people living in rich countries —say, a shop assistant at Macy’s— whose con-
tribution to the unjust policies of their country is much smaller than that 
of some of their more influential co-citizens. This issue is not specific to re-
distributive wars and arises in the exact same form in relation to defensive 
wars (Satz, 2005: 50).3 My main concern is to defend an equivalence claim: if 
2. For dramatic effect, I refer to rich people as “we” (author, reader, etc.) and poor people 
as “them”.
3. I use “defensive wars” in a narrow sense, i.e. as referring only to armed resistance 
against military aggression. By using the phrase “redistributive wars”, I do not imply that any
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ever there is a situation in which, say, the shop assistant at Macy’s is liable to 
attack in a defensive war waged against her country’s unjust aggression, the 
same applies to a situation in which her country takes part in imposing an 
unjust global structure.4 Finally, I will not address the issue of whether, given 
the correctness of Pogge’s account, punitive wars against rich countries are 
justified (Brooks 2007).
To avoid misunderstanding, let me emphasize that my main claim is a 
conditional equivalence claim, namely that if Pogge’s analysis of the causes 
of global poverty is correct, our relation to poor countries is morally equiva-
lent to one in which we each year killed 18 million of them by military means. 
So, first, I do not claim that Pogge’s analysis is correct and, second, anything 
that might be impermissible for poor countries to do in the latter situation 
involving military aggression —e. g. deliberately targeting rich civilians— 
might, consistently with all I say here, be impermissible in redistributive 
wars as well.
Some may view my main conclusion —that poor countries waging re-
distributive wars against us are acting justly given Pogge’s analysis of the 
causes of global poverty— as a reductio of Pogge’s analysis. I do not share 
this view: we should accept or reject Pogge’s analysis on other grounds. 
Moreover, I do not see any glaring absurdity in extending traditional the-
ories of jus ad bellum to allow for cases where, under certain conditions, 
states can justly or morally permissibly start redistributive wars (Beitz 1975: 
388). Several theorists have attempted to extend these theories to allow for 
just military intervention for humanitarian causes, having in mind cases 
where a powerful rich country intervenes in a poor country to stop its rul-
ing elite, or a bigoted section of its population, from killing large numbers 
of people (Caney 2005: 227-262; Holder 2008). What I am proposing is that 
it is not only true that certain wars can be just or permissible when started 
by a third party to protect a group of people from an unfolding or threaten-
ing humanitarian disaster. War can also be just and permissible when the 
likely victims of this humanitarian disaster start it themselves to avert the 
disaster befalling them. This can be so regardless of whether the immediate 
causes of death are disease or malnutrition rather than bullets or machetes. 
In extending just war theory to allow for just and permissible humanitarian 
interventions by some people on behalf of others, we should also allow for 
unjust distribution imposed by some countries on others is a just cause for war. Obviously, re-
distributive wars to eliminate poverty are easier to justify than redistributive wars to eliminate 
small, but unjust, inequalities between wealthy states. Also, by the term “redistribution” I do 
not suggest that no redistribution takes place between rich and poor countries in the absence 
of redistributive wars. 
4. I thank Laura Valentini for pointing out the need for stating this simplifying assump-
tion.
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similar intervention by people on their own behalf even when the cause 
of their plight is the (largely) non-military imposition of an unjust global 
structure. On the assumption that self-defence is no harder to justify than a 
third-party’s defence of someone against aggression, in one way at least it is 
difficult to resist this further step once one has admitted just humanitarian 
interventions. Similarly, most would allow that people may wage civil war 
on a regime unjustly reducing them to severe poverty.5 If Pogge is right there 
is an international institutional structure not relevantly different from that 
found within states. Given this assumption, it is hard to see why this point 
about the justifiability of waging civil war does not extend to waging war 
against states.
2.  POGGE ON GLOBAL POVERTY
Pogge’s claim that our relation to the massive number of poverty-related 
deaths in poor countries is one of doing harm has not been met with unani-
mous agreement, and various theorists have contended that we do not 
harm poor people without necessarily objecting to the claim that we ought 
to eliminate global poverty (Patten 2005; Risse 2005a; Risse 2005b; Risse, 
2005c; Satz 2005. For replies: Pogge 2005b). Here I want to bypass the is-
sue of whether Pogge’s analysis of global poverty is correct to focus on what 
follows regarding the morality of redistributive wars if his analysis is true. 
Thus, if you do not accept Pogge’s analysis of the nature of global poverty 
you need not disagree with me, even if you think the conclusions I draw do 
not apply to the world as it is. Before getting to the moral question of what 
poor people can permissibly do to improve their situation, I need to state 
how Pogge understands the way in which we bring about poverty in poor 
countries.
It is easy for people living in rich states to be impressed with the fact that 
some countries that were equally poor some decades ago are now tremen-
dously unequally poor, and some are no longer even poor by Western stand-
ards. It is also tempting for us to infer that what explains poverty must be 
the presence or absence of certain national factors, say, a well-functioning 
political system, political incompetence of local rulers, or the absence of a 
growth inducing work-ethics.6 Pogge does not deny that such factors are part 
of the causal background of global poverty. Assuming that it is the whole pic-
ture, however, amounts to what he calls “explanatory nationalism” insofar 
as doing so ignores the very significant causal contribution of a global insti-
5. I thank Andrew Williams for this point.
6. David Miller (2007: 238-247) defends a form of explanatory nationalism.
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tutional structure that includes, for example, the international trade regime 
regulating the flow of capital and goods (Pogge 2008: 17-18).7
In Pogge’s view, powerful Western states largely control global institu-
tional structures and design them to serve their interests. One reason this 
is so is that many poor countries do not have the resources available that 
they would need to pursue their interests effectively at the negotiating ta-
bles where international agreements are finalized. As a result, poor coun-
tries often sign treaties only to learn later of the many ways in which these 
disadvantage them. Another reason is that in those negotiations, rich coun-
tries have a much stronger negotiating position independently of the com-
petence of their diplomats. The fact that many troublesome governments in 
poor countries have been toppled by the military intervention by rich coun-
tries, but no troublesome rich governments have been toppled by military 
interventions by poor countries, is a perspicuous manifestation of the fact of 
unequal power.8 The upshot is that poor countries get a rough deal, and this 
explains much of the suffering and premature deaths occurring there.
Pogge describes a number of ways in which the global order systemati-
cally works to the advantage of the rich and to the detriment of the poor. 
First, there is the mechanism involved in the resource privilege: we “confer 
upon a group in power” legal ownership over the natural resources in the 
country that they (mis)rule. Accordingly, when a bunch of generals topple 
a democratically elected government we recognize their right to sell, say, 
their country’s oil resources and when oil companies buy these, we consider 
them the legitimate owners of the oil. A domestic analogue would be a case 
where we recognize gangsters who seized someone’s property as having ac-
quired rights over it and would consider someone who bought this property 
from the gangsters as the new legitimate owner of it. Not only does this make 
us complicit in the injustice being perpetrated against the person being 
robbed, our being so disposed gives gangsters an incentive to rob people.9 
7. Patten (2005: 23-24) argues that Pogge gives explanatory nationalism a rather cavalier 
treatment and at times fall for the opposite, equally biased view, explanatory cosmopolitanism, 
assuming that the large majority of poverty related deaths in poor countries are caused by the 
unjust global structure. See also Cohen 2010: 30 and Pogge 2010b: 182-191.
8. To keep the focus of justifi ability of redistributive war in the absence of military aggres-
sion by rich countries, I assume that the imposition of an unjust global structure takes place 
through means other than military ones. 
9. According to McMahan, in cases where a country unjustly aggresses against another 
country and as a result “the probability that other countries would commit wrongs of a sort that 
would constitute a just cause for war” against the latter country, the former country is to “some 
degree responsible for the increased risk of further wrongful action by others” and this might 
serve as a justification for acts of aggression against the former country provided if this would 
serve to reduce the probability of the risks in question, see McMahan 2005: 16. Since, on Pogge’s 
analysis, we impose an increased risk of military dictatorship on poor people by our unjust 
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Pogge believes that something analogous is true in international politics to 
such an extent that it may be a curse for a poor country to be rich in natural 
resources (Wenar 2008).
Second, there is the mechanism involved in the international borrow-
ing privilege. We have organized the international financial system in such a 
way that dictators can borrow money from banks in rich countries, siphon 
huge proportions off to their private bank accounts, and when they get over-
thrown we insist that the state, which they ruled over with no popular man-
date, honours the financial commitments dictatorially undertaken. Indeed, 
if a democratically elected government refuses to honour debts incurred by 
a former dictator, we will impose various sanctions on this country to make 
it pay “its” debts. Not only does this impose hardships on poor people due to 
something for which they bear no responsibility, like the resource privilege 
this creates destabilizing incentives for military coups that inevitably work 
to the disadvantage of poor people by rendering democratic government in 
poor countries difficult to achieve (Pogge 2008: 142).
Third, given that there is interaction between different states there has 
to be some kind of global structure. Whichever it is, it is one we bring about 
and, given the much better bargaining position of rich countries, it is one 
that we impose on the rest of the world and, accordingly, the effects that this 
system produces are effects that we do not merely allow to occur, but effects 
that we bring about. In Pogge’s view, there is no natural baseline global struc-
ture and, thus, no way we can say that its effects are merely effects we simply 
allow to occur. Accordingly, if we insist on implementing an unjust global 
structure, i. e. one that will predictably produce an unjust global distribu-
tion because it will leave millions of people impoverished in a way that will 
violate their human rights (as Pogge thinks is the case), we harm poor people 
unjustly (Pogge 2008: 5; Pogge 2005b: 55-56).10
If Pogge is right, citizens of affluent, powerful states are “accomplices 
in a monumental crime against humanity” and “guilty of the largest crime 
against humanity ever committed”. Pressing the point, Pogge even draws a 
striking analogy between global poverty and the Holocaust (Pogge, 2008: 24; 
Pogge 2005b: 59; Pogge 2005a: 2).11 The Holocaust’s victims, however, were 
imposition of a global structure, arguably this might similarly justify their aggressing against us 
provided this might reduce these risks.
10. Pogge (2005b: 60) restricts the scope of this claim to “human rights deficits”. Pogge 
(2008: 130) proposes “to call negative duty any duty to ensure that others are not unduly harmed 
(or wronged) through one’s own conduct”. As Croft (2005: 29) points out this implies that “all du-
ties entailed by any right are negative by definition”. 
11. Pogge (2005b: 67) writes that as “human rights are generally understood, it is in prin-
ciple permissible to use force to stop” violations of them. However, he wants neither to deny, 
nor to affirm, such “enforcement permissions”.
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justified in taking up arms to protect themselves from the Nazis or perhaps 
even simply to preserve their sense of dignity by fighting back. Nevertheless, 
Pogge refrains from considering whether the victims of the unjust global 
structure are justified in taking up arms against us to prevent themselves be-
ing killed by poverty and the unjust global structure that we impose on them 
(Pogge 2008: 11, 31, 141-142). Indeed, Pogge’s proposals seem surprisingly 
undemanding from a rich country perspective given his diagnosis of how 
we bring about global poverty. According to Pogge, international economic 
inequality is now so large that we could eliminate world poverty at negligible 
cost to ourselves: “Shifting merely 1 percent of aggregate global income... 
from [citizens of the affluent countries] to [the 46 percent of humankind 
who live below the World Bank’s $2/day poverty line] would eradicate se-
vere poverty worldwide” (Pogge 2008: 2). A shift of this sort may not even 
be a net cost to affluent people, since eliminating world poverty will also 
promote democracy and reduce immigration pressures on rich countries 
(Pogge 2008: 213). To bring about some such shift, Pogge proposes that we 
impose a $3 tax per barrel of oil traded (Global Resource Dividend) or that 
rich countries contribute less than 1% per of their GDP to a fund providing 
incentives for pharmaceutical companies to develop inexpensive medicine 
that will benefit the global poor.
Pogge might think that we are required to do more than what the pre-
vious paragraph indicates. But the fact of the matter is that we have not 
done anything remotely close to the modest proposals for the reduction of 
global poverty that he puts forwards. The question then becomes: since, in 
effect, we kill millions of global poor each year and since we could avoid 
doing so at very small cost to ourselves, could the global poor permissibly 
start a redistributive war against rich countries to eliminate global poverty? 
To give force to this question suppose that to avoid bearing the costs in-
volved in Pogge’s proposals for the eradication of global poverty we must 
each year kill 18 million people in poor countries by military means. No 
one thinks that the fact that rich people would avoid having to bear such 
costs would justify them in military aggression costing a number of inno-
cent lives comparable to the number of innocent lives lost during the whole 
of WWI. Since, given Pogge’s analysis, the morally relevant difference does 
not lie in the fact that in the military aggression scenario we kill people 
whereas in the unjust global structure scenario, we merely allow them to 
die, the difference, if there is one, must lie elsewhere. So what is the mor-
ally relevant difference that makes redistributive wars harder to justify than 
self-defensive wars?
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3.  JUS AD BELLUM
The most obvious starting place for answering this question is the tradi-
tional just war theory account of jus ad bellum. It claims that the following 
conditions must be satisfied for the initiation of a war to be just or morally 
permissible:12 “(1) there is a just cause; (2) war is authorized by legitimate au-
thority; (3) those waging the war have just intentions; (4) the costs incurred 
by the war are not disproportionate in comparison to the wrongs that jus-
tify the waging of war (proportionality); (5) war is the last resort; (6) the war 
has a reasonable chance of meeting its objectives; and, (7) its goal is a fair 
peace” (Caney 2005: 191-192). Assume these listed criteria are defensible. 
If so, we have an answer to our question if we can show that a defensive 
war waged by poor countries to prevent military attacks by rich countries 
threatening to kill 18 million of their citizens on a yearly basis can satisfy all 
seven conditions whereas an otherwise identical redistributive war waged 
by poor countries to undo an unjust global structure imposed on them by 
rich countries and threatening to kill 18 million of their citizens on a yearly 
basis does cannot satisfy those conditions. As will become clear, I am scepti-
cal of the view that any of the mentioned criteria will support the relevant 
asymmetry. I shall also argue that some of the assumed conditions for jus ad 
bellum should be revised or rejected.
Some of the traditional jus ad bellum criteria we can set aside quite swift-
ly because their irrelevance to our search for a relevant moral asymmetry is 
obvious. For instance, whatever we think of the legitimate authority condi-
tion (2), it is irrelevant to our question.13 Redistributive wars may be waged 
by a legitimate government —say, one that is democratically elected— just 
as defensive wars may be.
Consider next the just intention condition. Note, first, that insofar as some 
such requirement applies, it is ad hoc not to impose a similar restriction on 
intentions to uphold peace —jus ad pacem we might call it—. Provided that 
peace, unlike war, involved no relevantly similar harms, this would explain 
the relevant asymmetry, but since peace under an unjust global structure 
involves millions of deaths of innocents each year, this explanans fails. Sup-
pose poor countries can win a swift military victory and impose a just global 
structure, but that elites in poor countries refrain from waging war with the 
intention of preserving their privileges to the detriment of their poor citizens. 
Surely it is incoherent to consider their promoting peace with the wrong in-
12. A war may be just and yet morally impermissible, if the country that war is waged 
against is liable to attack, but the consequences of attacking it are very bad.
13. I fi nd (2) implausible anyway. See McMahan 2005; Kamm 2004: 652.
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tentions permissible and yet also consider wars waged with the wrong inten-
tions and much less costly in human lives impermissible because they fail to 
satisfy the right-intention requirement? Second, on the assumption that the 
intention to remove an unjust global structure that kills 18 million people a 
year is a just intention we can easily imagine redistributive wars being just 
(3).14 In principle, the aim of redistributive wars need not involve killing well-
off civilians or occupying their countries, but may simply be to bring about a 
fair peace, where a fair peace involves a just global structure (7).
In the case of the last resort requirement (5), we can easily imagine that 
a redistributive war is started after all other means that might reasonably be 
thought to eliminate the unjust global structure —e. g. negotiations, pleas, 
threats— have been tried and failed and that military force is the only avail-
able means left to oppose the unjust global structure. In any case, we should 
reject the last resort requirement at the level of fundamental moral princi-
ples of war.15 Suppose one pursues one’s just aims by means other than the 
use of resorting to war, say, through a trade embargo. Suppose also that one 
could achieve a quick military victory involving few casualties, but that the 
trade embargo would result in much greater sufferings. To insist on the in-
justice of war in this case on the ground that one can achieve one’s just aims 
without resorting to war, would rebel against the moral impulse behind the 
proportionality requirement. Indeed, here the status quo, i. e. peace, should 
be chosen only as a last resort given the massive harms it involves. My con-
jecture is that most people find the last resort requirement plausible because 
they believe that war will almost always involve greater harms than alterna-
tive means of realizing just ends and, accordingly, that its status is that of a 
principle which states should aim to comply with —something like a rule of 
thumb— that is derived from more basic moral concerns. In sum, (2), (3), 
(4), and (7) seem unable to ground a moral asymmetry between redistribu-
tive wars and defensive wars.
4.  THE JUST CAUSE REQUIREMENT (1)
The just cause requirement (1) is more complicated. On McMahan’s view 
the just cause requirement “functions entirely as a restriction on the type of 
aim or end that may legitimately be pursued by means of war” (McMahan 
14. Some deny that intentions matter to jus ad bellum. Had the intention of US behind 
entering WWII been to enlarge American power, this would have made doing so no harder to 
justify than had its intention been to defend itself. But see McMahan 2005; Goodin et al. 2007: 
669-677, 672-673. 
15. It might well be a perfectly justifi ed rule at the level of conventions of war, e. g. because 
states are all too likely to err on the side of thinking that their cause of war is just and that a 
military victory can be won swiftly and with few casualties.
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2005: 4).16 Some might think that the only just cause for war is self-defence 
against military aggression, in which case resistance against an unjust global 
structure is not a just cause. Or at least this follows if we grant the difference 
between standard cases of military aggression and Pogge’s scenario which 
consists in the fact that in the standard case aggression consists, inter alia, 
in the use of military means, whereas no such thing is the case in Pogge’s 
scenario. Does this difference make a moral difference to what means one 
can employ to defend oneself against a threat?
I think not. First, the distinction between military and non-military ag-
gression may not be entirely clear-cut and once we make it clear-cut, this 
distinction may not align perfectly with a morally relevant distinction. We 
might say that military aggression is aggression involving the use of military 
means thereby leaving us with the task of explaining what military means 
are. It will not do to say they involve the use of substances that can explode 
or damage the human body. Human beings were involved in military ag-
gression many centuries before gunpowder’s invention and a reconnais-
sance aircraft is a military means even if it not used directly to cause bodily 
damage.
The best definition of what military means are is a quite general function-
alist definition, i.e. military means are means that in a wide range of situa-
tions capable of destroying or incapacitating human beings or objects used 
by human beings in a way that is reliable and relatively direct. A gun is a 
military means because it satisfies this definition. But so is a device to jam 
computers. Some might claim that one cannot reliably predict the identities 
of the persons who will be killed through an unjust structure and for that 
reason it does not qualify as a military means. But that will not do, unless we 
are willing to grant that items such as poison gas and nuclear weapons do 
not count as military means.
But setting aside the issue of what falls under the proposed definition of 
military means, the more principled question is whether it matters morally 
to the permissibility of self-defence whether the means employed will kill 
one in a way that is reliable and relatively direct. If Pogge is right, an unjust 
global structure reliably kills a very large number of people and we can be 
confident that it will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. Hence, reli-
ability cannot account for the purported morally relevant difference. Direct-
ness might be different in that an unjust global structure tends to kill people 
in rather indirect ways. The causal chain leading from the negotiations at 
TRIPS to the death of a poor person in Kinshasa from the lack of cheap HIV 
16. A just cause is a fact that renders the war justifi able, whether it is what motivates agent 
that wages war.
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medicine may be very long and complicated. Still, whether a causal chain 
is direct makes no difference per se to the permissibility of self-defence. So 
compare attacks with two different bombs. One produces a blast that directly 
affects people’s bodies thereby killing them. Another bomb produces a blast 
that sets in motion a long and complicated causal chain that ends up result-
ing in the death of the same number of —perhaps the very same— people 
as the first bomb. It would be ludicrous to suppose that an agent acts less 
wrongly for using the latter bomb. Long and complicated causal chains may 
generally involve greater uncertainty about the eventual upshot than short 
and direct ones, and likelihood of outcome may make a difference to per-
missibility of self-defence. Similarly, in general the longer the causal chain 
is, the less likely it is that killing the initiator of the chain is necessary to avert 
the threat.17 But once we set these features aside, directness in itself seems 
not to matter morally. Hence, even if considerations of directness explain 
why the unjust global structure is not aggression by military means, it can-
not explain why one can do less to defend oneself against some such threat. 
Note finally that many just war theorists think that one can justly resort to 
war in response to threats that are much less harmful than one that involves 
18 million death per year. For instance, many think one may resort to war to 
prevent one from being expulsed from one’s homeland.18
Second, let us set aside the issue of the exact nature of the difference be-
tween aggression involving military means and aggression involving non-
military means. Still, it is not clear that it is never permissible to use lethal 
force in defence against non-military aggression. Consider domestic analo-
gies to each of the three elements identified above as elements in Pogge’s 
account of how we harm the global poor starting with the resource privilege. 
Suppose someone indicates to a gunman that if he seizes a democratically 
run family farm, she will buy the goods produced on the farm. She does so 
despite the fact the gunman is known to be a ruthless person and that if the 
gunman takes over the farm some members of the family are likely to be 
killed or otherwise seriously harmed by him and that all of them will lose 
their control over how the farm is run. In this case, members of the family 
would have a just cause were they to engage in hostile action directed at 
preventing the gunman from seizing the farm. Also, if such action was futile, 
but they could remove the incentive for the gunman to seize the farm and 
thereby bring about that the gunman does not seize it by attacking the per-
son who will buy the products and thereby creates the relevant incentive for 
the gunman they would have a just cause for doing so. Similarly, poor coun-
17. I owe this point to Seth Lazar.
18. McMahan (2005: 12) suggests that “it can be permissible to kill to prevent any sort of 
act that would wrongfully reduce a person to utter destitution”.
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tries have a just cause for starting a redistributive war against rich countries 
that create incentives for military coups by their policy to acknowledge the 
ruler’s absolute control over the natural resources of their country.19
The second mechanism that Pogge mentions —that we create incentives 
to military coups through the international borrowing privilege— is in sig-
nificant ways similar to the first one. But the last element in Pogge’s view is 
trickier. Consider Pogge’s claim that there is no baseline global structure and 
that if we impose a global structure on poor countries that do not ensure that 
their human rights to a decent minimum is met, then we have harmed them. 
Much here hangs on what Pogge means by “imposing”.
In principle, we could imagine scenarios in which rich countries merely 
allow the existence of an unjust global structure. Suppose the present global 
structure has already been put into place —say, all international interactions 
are and must be run through a huge and extremely complicated computer— 
and was created by states and people that no longer exist. It is very compli-
cated to change the global structure —it requires extensive changes to the 
computer software— and only rich countries can do that. However, since 
the global structure benefits rich people, they omit to change it, despite the 
unjust global distribution it results in. Suppose the reason that the resulting 
global distribution is unjust is that people in poor countries risk contracting 
certain diseases existing independently of the nature of the global structure. 
If they had more resources —as much resources as they are entitled to— they 
would be able to treat these diseases, but under the present distribution they 
lack that ability. On my understanding of the doctrine of doing and allowing, 
this would a clear case of allowing harm. Given that we could prevent this 
harm at very small costs to ourselves, we act impermissibly in not prevent-
ing it. The case would be like a case where we violate a positive duty to save 
a drowning person to avoid getting wet clothes.20 But we have not harmed 
these people and, giving the doctrine of doing and allowing, we had acted 
even more wrongly if we had not only omitted to change the global system, 
but actively imposed it on poor people. This case would be morally equiva-
lent to the case in which we kill people in poor countries through military 
19. Not all poor countries have suffered from military coups, e. g. India. So it would seem 
that poor Indians cannot say that they have been harmed through this mechanism. Something 
similar is true of China, although for different reasons.
20. Some might say of such a case: “You killed him by letting him drown”. However, here 
our moral evaluation of the conduct determines whether we classify it as a case of killing or as 
one of letting die, see Bennett 1989: 68-70. What we are interested in is the situation in which 
the moral difference derives from the fact that one case is correctly classified as a case of killing 
and the other as a case of letting die. In Pogge 2010b: 193, he says that he conceives of harm “in 
terms of an independently specified conception of social justice”. Because one can allow harm, 
a “justifized” account of harm is not a “justifized” account of doing harm.
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aggression. Since the case in which rich people impose an unjust structure 
on poor people is worse than one in which they merely refrain from chang-
ing it, the case in which they benefit from an unjust global structure is not 
as bad as one in which they kill poor people by military means. Correspond-
ingly, it might be easier to justify waging war in self-defence against military 
aggression than it would be to wage redistributive war to make rich people 
change the unjust global structure.
I suspect that Pogge will retort to this scenario by conceding that, in prin-
ciple, the global structure is something the persistence of which we could 
imagine rich countries merely allowed, but insist that in our world the global 
structure is something that we reproduce continuously, i.e. by diplomatic 
negotiations, military interventions, and economic incentives. Accordingly, 
we bring about the deaths that are caused by the global structure.
In reply, one might ask what the relevant baseline situation is that we 
should compare the present situation with in order to determine which 
poverty related deaths are caused by us. Presumably, not all such deaths are 
caused by us, since presumably some such deaths would occur even if we 
cooperated in bringing about a just global structure.21
Pogge might say that there is no relevant baseline here. That all relevant 
situations involve a global structure and if we bring about a global structure 
that involves an unjust distribution, we have harmed those people who the 
global structure harms. As indicated earlier, I am sceptical about this view.22 
But even if the view is true, it implies that there is a relevant difference be-
tween killing people through imposing an unjust global structure and killing 
people by other means where there is a clear baseline situation relative to 
which one can be said to harm them, i.e. one in which one refrains from 
military aggression, and as a result people survive who otherwise would be 
killed.
As a final attempt to appeal to the just cause condition to ground the 
moral asymmetry of redistributive and defensive wars, one might appeal to 
the fact that in cases of military aggression the military aggressor intends 
the killing and maiming that will take place in the cause of war. Even if the 
aggressor does not intend to kill enemy civilians, the aggressor does intend 
to kill enemy combatants. No such thing is true of rich first world countries 
that impose an unjust world order on third world countries. When first world 
countries lend money to dictators who control natural resources it is not 
21. There might be people who flourish under the present unjust global structure that 
would perish under a just global structure.
22. The relevant baseline situation might be one in which rich countries stopped interact-
ing with poor countries. 
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part of their intention that this will undermine democratic political insti-
tutions, encourage military coups, and predictably lead to poverty. Indeed, 
they might truly regret that dictators do what they do.
Suppose this difference in intentions exists and is morally significant. 
Still, it is insufficiently important to rule out just wars. Consider the follow-
ing scenario. For some odd reason a nation can only avoid certain costs, say 
violent internal political strife, by firing missiles at another country. These 
costs will be avoided if the missiles are launched, whether they hit their 
targets or not. The aggressing country has no intention to subdue or harm 
its neighbouring country and launches the missiles only to avoid the costs 
mentioned. If self-defence by the targeted neighbouring country had been 
permissible had the aggressing country aggressed with standard intentions, 
in this case self-defence is permissible as well. However, it might be insisted 
that absence of aggressive intentions makes some difference to permissi-
bility of self-defence, but, surely, no one contends that it makes such a big 
difference that in the case I imagine the nation attacked must stand idly by 
watching thousands of its citizens die simply because the attacking nation 
merely foresees these deaths. But if the absence of intentions to cause death 
and suffering makes no or only little moral difference to permissibility in 
the case of military aggression, why should it make any (larger) difference 
in the case of global structure aggression? Suppose rich countries imposed 
an unjust global structure on poor countries with the intention of causing 
the global poor to suffer. On the view I am canvassing poor countries would 
be justified in waging a redistributive war in response and this justification 
would not disappear, or significantly weaken, because we change the exam-
ple so that rich countries no longer intend to bring about this effect. If so, the 
difference in intentions of military aggressors and the imposers of an unjust 
global structure, supposing it to exist, cannot explain why war is justified in 
response in one case but not in the other.23
In sum, the just cause requirement, plausibly construed, does not rule 
out the possibility of just redistributive wars. With regard to the first two 
mechanisms through which the unjust global structure produces poverty, 
these would seem morally equivalent to cases involving military aggression. 
23. A different line of argument would hold that whereas rich people are aware of how 
their countries causally affect the lives of poor people in the case of military aggression, typi-
cally, rich people are not aware of how their countries causally affect the lives of poor people 
through the imposition of an unjust global structure. However, this difference is insufficient to 
ground the relevant moral asymmetry. First, the fact that one does not believe that one, together 
with others, poses a threat is not sufficient for the impermissibility of lethal self-defence. Many 
hold that it suffices that one ought to have known that one posed a threat and, second, many 
would say that even if it is not the case that one ought to have known, it is still permissible to 
take lethal defensive action against one. 
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As a slight modification that leaves this overall conclusion intact I have ar-
gued that the last component in Pogge’s view might render redistributive 
wars harder to justify.
5.  THE PROPORTIONALITY REQUIREMENT (4) AND THE NO FUTILITY 
REQUIREMENT (6)
An obvious argument against the permissibility of redistributive war appeals 
to the proportionality principle (4), or to the futility requirement (6). Ac-
cording to the former requirement, starting a war is only permissible if “the 
relevant good effects a war can be expected to achieve are sufficiently im-
portant to justify the relevant expected bad effects” (McMahan 2005: 674).24 
According to the latter requirement, it is not justified to start a war to achieve 
global redistribution if there is no reasonable chance of achieving this.25 It 
may seem neither condition is met. For rich countries are militarily much 
stronger than poor countries. While voluntary global redistribution is pretty 
unlikely, it seems even more unlikely that rich countries will agree to redis-
tribution as a result of a military aggression that they can easily defeat. Even 
if we were to suppose, unrealistically, that there was a reasonable chance of 
achieving a just global structure through military action against rich coun-
tries by poor countries, we could expect the costs in lives to be tremendous. 
Given the military hardware possessed by rich countries, redistributive wars 
will probably result in numbers of casualties well in excess of the two previ-
ous world wars. They will also involve damage to economies on such a scale 
that poor people, their supposed beneficiaries, will suffer massive harms 
greater even than (or: in addition to) those involved in global poverty. Hence, 
it is unlikely that redistributive war will satisfy the proportionality and the 
non-futility requirements.
I have several things to say in response. First, in relation to jus in bello it is 
common to distinguish between liability to being attacked and its being per-
missible to attack one. A person who is liable to attack is not wronged when 
he is attacked. He has no right not to be attacked that is either infringed or 
violated when he is attacked (McMahan 2009: 10). It might nevertheless be 
24. The formulation says “relevant” because arguably not all good and bad effects of a war 
are relevant to whether it satisfies the proportionality requirement, e. g. war might accelerate 
the development of life-saving medicine, but the lives saved in this way may be irrelevant to the 
proportionality requirement. 
25. This shows that (6) is implausible. Suppose that the proportionality requirement is 
satisfied and suppose that while waging war most certainly will not meet the objectives of those 
waging war —say, eliminating global poverty— but will come pretty close to doing so. It is im-
plausible to deny, on account of the fact that the war failed to fully meet its objective, that it 
would be unjust.
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the case that it is impermissible to attack him, say, because attacking him 
will lead to very bad consequences. A similar distinction is drawn in relation 
to jus ad bellum. A state —or the citizens that compose this state— may not 
be wronged when some other state starts a war against it, say, because it is 
morally responsible for the existence of an unjust military threat to other 
states. Yet, it may be impermissible to attack this state, e. g. because doing so 
will lead to mass killings and suffering (McMahan 2005: 8). We may say that 
a war may be just, even if it is not morally justified.
On the assumption that this distinction is also applicable to jus ad bel-
lum, I believe that while the facts appealed to —that redistributive wars will 
be futile and the harms they involve disproportionate— imply that it might 
be impermissible for poor countries to start redistributive wars against rich 
countries, they do not show that rich countries are not liable to being at-
tacked and that attacks wrong their citizens. The reason is that it is they, i.e. 
rich people, that prevent redistributive wars from having good results and 
that they act unjustly in making this the case.26 One’s liability to harm cannot 
diminish because one will act in certain unjust ways if threatened with that 
harm. If liability does depend on one’s ability to defeat self-defence and to 
impose disproportionate harms in the process of resisting one’s victim’s self-
defence, a country (or an individual attacker) may gain immunity against 
attack by building a doomsday bomb and making it certain that any attempt 
to resist this country’s aggression will result in its use. Also, if the defender 
could defeat the attacker’s use of these disproportionate means in response 
to defensive action this might mean that the attacker would be liable to ad-
ditional harms, i.e. harms to which he would not be liable were he not com-
mitted to employing these disproportionate means. But since it is hard to see 
why the attacker should not be liable to these extra harms simply because 
the defender has no way of averting the employment of the disproportionate 
means, this supports the view that rich countries are liable to attack despite 
their ability to defeat any attempt to impose a just global structure and to 
impose disproportionate harms on any poor country that tries.
Second, if the present line of argument encounters resistance I ask the 
reader to make some counterfactual assumptions. Suppose that redistribu-
tive wars would not be futile. Perhaps most members of rich countries are 
too old for military service, their electorates are extremely concerned about 
security and willing to sacrifice much of their wealth to restore (a less un-
just) peace once the war proves not to be a walk-over, and poor countries 
have also acquired weapons of mass destruction and can draw on vast pools 
26. Rich countries cannot complain to poor countries that they are waging an unjust war 
on grounds of its violation of the proportionality requirement given that this disproportionate 
destruction is something they bring about.
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of young men eager to join their armies. Suppose too that the harms redis-
tributive wars involve are proportionate to the wrongs avoided. Perhaps af-
ter some fighting and tens of thousands casualties rich countries are willing 
to accept a peace that addresses the grievances of poor countries. Granted 
these assumptions, would it then be permissible for poor countries to initi-
ate redistributive wars?.27 I take it that many would, initially at least, resist 
this suggestion and, hence, that it is worthwhile to see if it can be defended.
Thirdly, the futility and the proportionality requirements are unable to 
ground an asymmetry between redistributive wars and defensive wars. Sup-
pose that rich countries would kill through military means 18 million people 
in poor countries a year. Poor countries ponder the possibility of waging a 
defensive war against rich countries. However, if they do this it will be futile 
—they will not succeed in stopping rich countries from what they are doing— 
and the response by rich countries will be massive such that the proportion-
ality condition is not met. On the jus ad bellum criteria waging a defensive 
war would not be permissible and it would not be so for exactly the reasons 
as why an otherwise comparable redistributive war would be impermissible. 
Accordingly, while the two requirements may show why some redistributive 
wars are not permissible, they do not show that rich countries are not liable 
to redistributive war. Nor do they show that there is any morally relevant 
asymmetry between redistributive and defensive wars. More generally, the 
conditions of jus ad bellum, when plausibly construed, do not rule out third 
party humanitarian intervention; nor do they rule out victims of aggression 
intervening in self-defence when third parties are permitted to intervene on 
their behalf. This may not be the normal understanding of jus ad bellum but 
it does make the doctrine as plausible as possible.
Note, finally, that the objection that redistributive wars against rich coun-
tries will involve the mass killings of innocent civilians as a side-effect and 
that this implies that hardly any redistributive wars are just is of little rel-
evance to the present situation. First, according to Pogge we are not inno-
cent civilians in relation to the plight of the global poor. As he puts it: we are 
“accomplices in a monumental crime against humanity” (Pogge 2008: 24). If 
so, harms to us (or many of us, at any rate) counts for less than harms to in-
nocent civilians in proportionality calculations and, presumably, redistribu-
tive wars involving a huge number of killings of rich people are not unjust 
27. Note, first, that if the redistributive war aims only at eliminating global poverty, it might 
be rational for rich countries to accept the demands of poor countries rather than to engage in a 
war to avoid the comparatively small costs that, according to Pogge, eliminating global poverty 
involves. Second, while the proportionality and the futility requirement obviously are extremely 
unlikely to be met in the case of a full-scale redistributive war, it is unclear that they are very 
unlikely to be met in the case of various asymmetric forms of warfare aimed at eliminating the 
unjust global structure, see Smilansky 2004: 798.
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on account of the proportionality requirement provided they are conducive 
to the undoing of the unjust global structure. Second, even setting aside this 
point, considerations about the killing of rich innocents would not estab-
lish an asymmetry between redistributive and defensive wars, since many 
rich people are innocent in relation to their countries’ military aggression 
against poor countries.
6.  A REDUCTIO OF POGGE’S POSITION?
None of the conditions in traditional just war theory explains why it would 
not be permissible for poor countries to engage in a redistributive war against 
us to undo the unjust and lethal global structure that, according to Pogge, we 
impose on them. Some might reason that since, obviously, it is unjust to start 
a war against states not bent on military aggression and since it would follow 
if Pogge’s analysis of global poverty —its scope and its causes— is correct 
that it would be just for poor countries to aggress against us, Pogge’s account 
of the causes of global poverty must be false, or at least regarded with the 
utmost suspicion.
As I said, this paper aims neither to defend nor criticize Pogge’s account of 
global poverty. Hence, in this section I restrict myself to explaining why I do 
not think this particular line of argument has much bite. First, it might sur-
prise us that we harm, and do not just allow harm to, poor people. But if we al-
low that, it is hard to see why they cannot impose considerable costs on us to 
stop us from imposing on them, e. g. by redistributive wars if necessary. If an 
agent will predictably kill someone provided she conducts herself in a certain 
way and she can avoid acting in this way at little cost to herself, the wrongness 
of the killing does not seem much, if at all, affected by the means employed. 
Moreover, many people believe that it is permissible to fight just wars to avoid 
outcomes that seem morally much less bad than 18 million premature deaths. 
For instance, many believe that a state can permissibly fight a defensive war 
against mitigated aggression, i.e. defend itself against an aggressor that care-
fully minimizes enemy losses and merely aims to occupy the relevant territory 
to gain certain military advantages leaving the occupied people largely free to 
govern its own affairs. The conjecture that we are liable to redistributive wars 
provided Pogge’s analysis of global poverty is correct may seem initially im-
plausible largely because we, not someone else, are at the receiving end.
Second, even if, contrary to what I contend, it is an implausible conclu-
sion, its implausibility is not a reason for rejecting Pogge’s analysis. Pogge’s 
analysis concerns the extent as well as the causal determinants of global 
poverty. No one would be tempted to infer from the putative permissibility 
of redistributive wars that, luckily, the extent of global poverty must be much 
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smaller than he contends. In response to that inference we would respond 
that there are various tests for determining the extent of global poverty and 
these are good or bad tests independently of whatever normative impli-
cations can be derived from the results one gets from applying them and 
various underlying normative principles. We should say something similar 
about ways of testing for the causal relevance of a certain factor. So, for in-
stance, if we want to determine the causal relevance of the global structure, 
in principle, we could compare episodes in world history where the global 
structure has differed in relevant ways. If national differences have had the 
same causal impact in the epochs compared, this supports the view that glo-
bal structure does not explain global poverty. If, on the other hand, national 
differences had very different impacts in the epochs compared, this suggests 
that global structure does play a significant role in the causing of global pov-
erty. Again, whatever normative implications the result of such comparisons 
may support is neither here, nor there.28
7. CONCLUSION
Pogge argues that rich countries do not merely allow global poverty to per-
sist by failing to help people. Rather, we make global poverty exist by impos-
ing an unjust global structure on poor countries. For the sake of argument, I 
have assumed that this claim is correct to see whether its truth would render 
us liable to redistributive wars, and perhaps even imply that it would be per-
missible for poor countries to attack us to bring about a just global order 
thereby saving the lives of millions of poor people. For this purpose, I have 
compared the present situation on Pogge’s account with one in which rich 
countries kill 18 million poor people a year by military means. Clearly, the 
traditional jus ad bellum criteria permit a defensive war in this case. I have 
argued that from the point of view of these criteria, on their most plausible 
construal, there is at most a marginal difference in the moral status of redis-
tributive wars and the relevant hypothetical defensive war. Finally, I have 
argued that this implication of Pogge’s account fails to make the account 
implausible but that even if it did the implication would provide no reason 
to reject Pogge’s appeal to the global structure to explain world poverty.29
28. While the fact that a causal analysis has results that support unwanted normative im-
plications gives us no reason to think that the results are false, it may give us a practical reason 
to double-check the results. Also, the fact that the theorist conducting the analysis embraces 
the normative implications that the analysis supports might give us reason to believe that the 
analysis is more likely to be faulty than if the theorists disliked the normative results that it sup-
ports. None of what I say here contradicts these two claims.
29. Whether redistributive wars would be just even if rich people merely fail to meet their 
positive duties to help poor people is a separate question that I have not taken a stand on here, 
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